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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
law enforcement officers to detect the contents of a residence in a
manner that would not be considered a search.41 Given the de-
structive impact that drugs have on modern society and the inves-
tigative ingenuity, nonintrusiveness, and effectiveness that the ca-
nine-sniff technique represents, it is suggested that the Dunn court
erred when it failed to consider the nature and character of the
canine-sniff procedure in reasoning that a search had occurred. As
a result of the holding in Dunn, it seems that "as between cops
and crooks, the [New York Court of Appeals] gave [crooks] the
upper hand. '42
Mark A. Varrichio, Jr.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1): New York Court of Appeals fash-
ions "alter ego" test to determine whether corporate employees
are shielded from ex parte communications
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the New York Lawyer's Code
of Professional Responsibility makes it unethical for attorneys to
engage in ex parte communications with a "party" known to be
represented by counsel, absent the consent of that party's counsel.1
The scope of the term "party" is not clear when a corporation is
41 See Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 25, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392. Under the
Dunn court's approach, it is apparent that anything located in a private residence that is
detected by means of a supersensitive detection device is deserving of New York State con-
stitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure. See id.
42 Loewy, supra note 3, at 331. Professor Loewy, in reference to the Supreme Court's
decision in Place, suggests that the Court gave the police the upper hand in fighting crime
by concluding that the use of the canine-sniff technique did not constitute a search. See id.
It is suggested that as a result of the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Dunn, the
police are at a severe disadvantage in attempting to thwart the efforts of crafty drug dealers.
I N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PRoFEssioNAL RESONsmirirry, DR 7-104(A)(1) (1990). DR 7-
104(A) provides in part:
During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
1. Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by a
lawyer in that matter unless the lawyer has the prior consent of the law-
yer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
Id.
The rule was derived from Canon 9 of the American Bar Association Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, which was superseded by the American Bar Association Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility in 1970. See Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's
Client: The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 685 (1979).
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the party in the legal action.' Since the corporate party is a face-
less entity that may operate only through its employees,3 it is nec-
essary to determine which employees are "parties" under the disci-
plinary rule.4 This determination entails a balancing of the need to
protect "parties" from inadvertent disclosures of privileged infor-
mation, extracted by shrewd opposing counsel, against the need for
unburdened access to relevant information.5 In light of these com-
2 See Wright v. Group Health Hasp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 197, 691 P.2d 564, 567 (1984)
(en banc) (considering scope of term "party").
For the purposes of this Survey, it is assumed that the employees of the corporate party
are not named parties in the suit.
3 See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTER-
PRISES 144-47 (1983) (corporation is fictional entity).
" See Wright, 103 Wash. 2d at 198, 691 P.2d at 568. A corporation can be protected
from unscrupulous adverse counsel only by protecting the employees through whom it
speaks. See Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 626 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
5 See Miller & Calfo, Ex parte Contact with Employees and Former Employees of a
Corporate Adversary: Is It Ethical?, 42 Bus. LAW. 1053, 1055 (1987) (discussing competing
interests).
The primary justification for the disciplinary rule is its effect of diminishing the likeli-
hood that an opposing attorney will take unfair advantage of a represented layperson. See
Kurlantzik, The Prohibition on Communication with an Adverse Party, 51 CONN. B.J. 136,
145-46 (1977). "[T]he presence of the party's attorney theoretically neutralizes the contact
[with the layperson]." Wright, 103 Wash. 2d at 197, 691 P.2d at 567. This justification con-
templates a situation in which an attorney indicates to an unwary opposing party that the
latter's case is weak, but that a sum of money will be advanced if the party signs a release
form. See Kurlantzik, supra, at 138.
Justifications for the rule also include protecting a party from inadvertently disclosing
privileged information and minimizing the possibility of conflict between an attorney's duty
to represent his client vigorously and his duty to refrain from overreaching with respect to
an unprotected party. See id. at 145-46, 152. Opponents of the disciplinary rule criticize it
as a source of unnecessary inconvenience and cost since it barricades potential witnesses
from informal interviews and necessitates costly discovery procedures. See Leubsdorf, supra
note 1, at 687. Further, the increased costs "may well frustrate the right of [a party] with
limited resources to a fair trial and deter other litigants from pursuing their legal remedies."
See Frey v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(citation omitted). The disciplinary rule also has been said to prevent free dissemination of
relevant information and thus to act as an obstacle to the truth finding process. See Com-
ment, Ex Parte Communications with Corporate Parties: The Scope of the Limitations on
Attorney Communications With One of Adverse Interest, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 1274, 1278-80
(1988); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). "Proper preparation of a cli-
ent's case demands that [the attorney] assemble information, sift what [the attorney] con-
siders relevant from the irrelevant... without undue and needless interference." Id. But see
Kurlantzik, supra, at 146. "Though truth is one of the prime objectives of [our legal] sys-
tem, our society is not.., willing to pay an unlimited price for it in other moral values." Id.
However, ex parte interviews "are an efficient and inexpensive way of determining who does
or does not have relevant information and, therefore, who should be deposed." Bey v. Ar-
lington Heights, No. 88 C 5479, at 1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file). "[Tihey [also] provide information counsel may need ... to conduct meaningful dis-
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peting interests, courts have labored to develop an unequivocal
definition of "party" for use in the corporate setting.6 Although no
one definition has achieved universal acceptance,' four commonly
posited formulations are the "blanket rule,"8 the "control group"
test,9 the "scope-of-employment" test,10 and the "case-by-case bal-
covery." Id.
O Miller & Calfo, supra note 5, at 1053. "[C]ourts, bar associations, and commentators
have struggled with the issue [of] whether a corporate party's employee should be consid-
ered a 'party' ." Wright, 103 Wash. 2d at 198, 691 P.2d at 568.
7 See Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 18 (D. Mass. 1989) ("none of the tests
succeeds in striking a balance which accommodates ... competing needs in every case");
Miller & Calfo, supra note 5, at 1053. "Despite the importance of this issue in the everyday
of corporate litigation, the ethical rules regulating ex parte contacts with employees.., are
not clear." Id.; see also Stahl, Ex Parte Interviews with Enterprise Employees: A Post-
Upjohn Analysis, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1181, 1184 (1987) (disciplinary rule is "at best
ambiguous" and "at worst conflicting").
' See Miller & Calfo, supra note 5, at 1071 (advocating blanket rule). This "bright line
test" protects all current employees of a corporation. Id. The blanket rule approach prohib-
its all ex parte contacts with current employees, resulting in a broad definition of the term
"party." Id. at 1060; see also Mills Land & Water Co. v. Golden West Ref. Co., 186 Cal.
App. 3d 116, 127-28, 230 Cal. Rptr. 461, 467 (1986) ("no ex parte contact is permissible
absent a court order permitting it"). But see CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 2-
100 (West Supp. 1990) (new disciplinary rule permits attorneys to conduct ex parte inter-
views with certain corporate employees). The main benefit of the blanket rule is that it
facilitates an attorney's determination of who can and cannot be informally interviewed. See
Miller & Calfo, supra note 5, at 1061. This protects a corporate party's interests and avoids
possible future disciplinary actions. Id. at 1071. But see supra note 5 (citing sources criticiz-
ing disciplinary rule). However, "no court has held it improper to contact any and all em-
ployees of an opposing party." Wyeth, Talking to the Other Side's Employees and Ex-
Employees, 15 LrriG. J. SEC. LrrIG. A.B.A. 8, 10 (No. 4 1989).
' See Comment, supra note 5, at 1286. The control group test substantially reduces the
scope of the disciplinary rule by protecting only those employees that "have sufficient deci-
sion-making or advisory responsibilities within the [corporation]." See Fair Automotive Re-
pair, Inc. v. Car-X Serv. Sys., 128 Ill. App. 3d 763, 771, 471 N.E.2d 554, 561 (1984). In other
words, ex parte interviews with upper-echelon employees, such as executive officers, are im-
permissible, while contacts with middle and low-level managers are left unprotected. See
Comment, supra note 5, at 1286. Although the test permits a greater amount of relevant
information to be discovered informally, it has been criticized severely for defeating the
purposes of the disciplinary rule as applied to corporations. See, e.g., Morrison, 125 F.R.D.
at 16-17 (problem with test is that statements made by any agents of corporation within
scope of their employment are admissible against corporation); Massa v. Eaton Corp., 109
F.R.D. 312, 313-14 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (same); see also Comment, supra note 5, at 1288 &
n.86 (enumerating problems with control group standard).
10 The scope-of-employment test also is referred to as the binding-admissions or man-
aging-speaking test. See, e.g., Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253-54 (D. Kan.
1988) (applying managing-speaking test to protect corporate employees with managerial re-
sponsibilities, those whose acts or omissions are connected with current legal matter or
those whose statements may constitute binding admissions against corporation); In re In-
dustrial Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 80 C 3479, slip op. at 4 (N.D. IlM. Nov. 25, 1985) (same);
Miller & Calfo, supra note 5, at 1056-60 (critique of binding-admissions test). The test rep-
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ancing" test.11 Recently, the New York Court of Appeals in Niesig
v. Team 1,12 rejected the existing tests and fashioned the so-called
"alter ego" test to determine whether corporate employees are
shielded from ex parte communications. 3
In Niesig, a personal injury action, the plaintiff moved for per-
mission to have his attorney conduct ex parte interviews with the
corporate defendant's employees, 14 who were considered possible
resents a compromise between the blanket rule and the control group test. Comment, supra
note 5, at 1290-91. It protects corporate-managerial employees "who have the legal authority
to 'bind' the corporation in a legal evidentiary sense." Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103
Wash. 2d 192, 200-01, 691 P.2d 564, 569-70 (1984) (en banc). That is, employees with mana-
gerial responsibilities whose statements may constitute binding admissions against the cor-
poration may not be interviewed ex parte. See Wright, id. at 200, 691 P.2d at 569. Critics
consider the test "too expansive... [because] [i]t leaves few, if any, employees outside the
reach of DR 7-104." Monahan v. Johnson, 128 F.R.D. 659, 661 (N.D. Ill. 1989); see also,
Comment, supra note 5, at 1293-94 (outlining shortcomings of scope-of-employment test).
The test is criticized also for its failure to consider the capacity of low level employees to
make binding admissions against the corporation. See Miller & Calfo, supra note 5, at 1056-
60.
"' See Monahan, 128 F.R.D. at 661. Rather than attempt to concoct a universal test,
courts adopting the case-by-case balancing test determine on a case-by-case basis whether
an employee is a "party." Id. The test entails balancing the risks of informal ex parte inter-
viewing against the benefits that such interviewing will provide by bringing to light impor-
tant information. Id.; see also Siguel v. Trustees of Tufts College, No. 88-0626-Y, at 8 (D.
Mass. Mar. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (describing test as balancing need to
speak informally against need to ensure effective representation); Frey v. Department of
Health & Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying case-by-case balancing
test approved in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956,
961 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983)). The test has been criticized for not provid-
ing a clear standard for attorneys to determine their ethical boundaries and for creating a
risk that similarly situated employees will be treated differently. See Siguel, No. 88-0626-Y,
at 13.
12 76 N.Y.2d 363, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1990).
11 See id. at 373-76, 558 N.E.2d at 1034-36, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497-99; see also infra note
27 and accompanying text (defining alter ego test).
Several courts have used the term "alter ego" to describe a test that is in essence the
control group test. See University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (alter ego test permits ex parte interviews with "managerial employees"). In Frey, 106
F.R.D. at 35, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York utilized the term
"alter ego" to describe "individuals who can bind [the corporation] to a decision or settle
controversies on its behalf." See Monahan, 128 F.R.D. at 663 (applying alter ego test an-
nounced in Frey). The court of appeals' alter ego test in Niesig appears to be a distinct
formulation.
14 Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 386, 558 N.E.2d at 1031, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 494. The plaintiff
alleged that he was injured when he fell from scaffolding at a construction site while em-
ployed by the third-party corporate defendant. Id. The plaintiff brought a suit against the
general contractor of the project and the property owner, asserting causes of action based on
§ 240 of the New York Labor Law. Id. Subsequently, the defendants brought a third-party
action against the plaintiff's corporate employer. Id.
1218
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
witnesses to the accident in which the plaintiff was injured. 15 The
New York State Supreme Court, Nassau County, in determining
whether these employees fell under the protective shroud of Disci-
plinary Rule 7-104(A) (1),16 held that neither the current nor the
former employees of the corporate defendant could be interviewed
ex parte.7 The Appellate Division, Second Department, applying
the blanket rule, modified the lower court decision, holding that
the disciplinary rule only applies to current employees.'
8
Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Kaye rejected the
blanket rule'9 because it slows the course of dispute resolution
20
and results in unnecessary costs.2' The court also rejected the con-
1 Niesig v. Team I, 149 A.D.2d 94, 98, 545 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 (2d Dep't 1989), modified,
76 N.Y.2d 363, 369, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (1990). "[P]laintiff's attor-
ney averred that a former employee of [the corporate defendant] had testified at a deposi-
tion that several [corporate] employees had been present at the site on the day of the acci-
dent." Id.
16 See id. The plaintiff asserted that since these employees were neither "managerial
nor controlling employees," ex parte interviews were permissible under DR 7-104(A)(1).
Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 368, 558 N.E.2d at 1031, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 494. In opposition to the
plaintiff's motion, the corporate defendant urged that the disciplinary rule should bar ex
parte interviews with all employees. Id.
" See Niesig, 149 A.D.2d at 98, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 155 ("denied that branch of the plain-
tiff's motion which was for authorization for .. . ex parte interviews of nonmanagerial
employees").
Is Id. at 106, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 159; see also Cagguila v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 127
F.R.D. 653, 654 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (calling appellate division's rationale in Niesig a "very
well articulated and persuasive one"); supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing blan-
ket rule). The appellate division's decision was clearly based on Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), which held that the attorney-client privilege may be applied to
all of a corporation's employees. Id. at 396-97; see also Niesig, 149 A.D.2d at 101, 545
N.Y.S.2d at 156 ("Upjohn case defines the scope of the common-law attorney-client
privledge, which has been adopted in New York"). But see Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consid-
eration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443, 444 (1982)
("Court [in Upjohn] purported to decide little more than that the communications in the
case before it were protected by the privilege"). The appellate division rationalized that a
corporate employee protected under Upjohn is necessarily a "party" under DR 7-104(A)(1).
See Niesig, 149 A.D.2d at 101, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
19 See Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 372-73, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497. The appel-
late division's decision was modified rather than reversed because the court of appeals
agreed that only current employees, not former employees, fall within the purview of DR 7-
104(A)(1). Id. at 369, 558 N.E.2d at 1032, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 495. The plaintiff's motion to
allow the ex parte interviews was granted. Id.
1* See id. at 372, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497. Under the blanket rule
informal channels of discovery in the corporate context would be virtually nonexistent. Id.
21 Id. ("[c]ostly formal depositions .. .may deter litigants with limited resources").
Furthermore, the court of appeals was not persuaded by the appellate division's contention
that a "party" protected by the attorney-client privilege necessarily should be protected by
the disciplinary rule. See id. at 371-72, 558 N.E.2d at 1033-34, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497. The
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trol group test since it "all but nullifies the benefits of the discipli-
nary rule"22 in the corporate context and the case-by-case balanc-
ing test since it gives "too little guidance, or otherwise seem[s]
unworkable. ' 23 In an effort to "best balance[] the competing policy
interests '24 and to "incorporate[] the most desirable elements of
the other approaches, '25 the court of appeals fashioned the alter
ego test.26 Pursuant to this test, "employees whose acts or omis-
sions in the matter under inquiry are binding on... or imputed to
the corporation . .. , or employees implementing the advice of
counsel," are "parties" under the disciplinary rule.27
In a lone concurrence, Judge Bellacosa vigorously opposed the
adoption of the alter ego test.28 He agreed with the court's rejec-
tion of the blanket test, but urged the adoption of the control
group test instead.29 The latter, he argued, "better balances the re-
spective interests by allowing the maximum number of informal
interviews among persons with potentially relevant information,
while safeguarding the attorney protections afforded the men and
court of appeals considered the attorney-client privilege and the disciplinary rule distinct
because they serve different purposes and promote different policies. Id.
First, the attorney-client privilege extends only to communications, not to the "underly-
ing factual information ...which is in issue here." Id. at 372, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 497; see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 (privilege protects only communications,
not facts). But see G. HAZZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 437 (1985) (employee covered by privilege under
Upjohn should be "party" under ethical rules). Second, the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to encourage open communication between client and attorney; that is not the
purpose of the disciplinary rule. Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 372, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d
at 497. "The purpose of the disciplinary rule ... is to protect the corporation so its agents
who have the authority to prejudice the entity's interest are not unethically influenced by
adverse counsel." Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 201-02, 691 P.2d 564,
570 (1984) (en banc).
22 Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 373, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497-98.
2S Id. at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
2, Id.; see also Miller & Calfo, supra note 5, at 1055-56 (discussing competing policy
concerns).
25 Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498. The Court of
Appeals noted that since the alter ego test is similar to tests adopted in other jurisdictions,
the alter ego test should be workable. See id. at 375 & nn.5-6, 558 N.E.2d at 1036 & nn.5-6,
559 N.Y.S.2d at 499 & nn.5-6.
26 Id. at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1036-37, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499-500 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
Judge Bellacosa concurred because he agreed with the majority's grant of the plaintiff's
motion to allow the ex parte interviews. Id.
29 Id. at 376-77, 558 N.E.2d at 1037, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
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women whose protection may well be of paramount concern." 30
Judge Bellacosa posited that the alter ego test would "function al-
most identically with the rejected [blanket rule] ... [because both
tests] severely limit access to parties with relevant information."31
Furthermore, he expressed concern that the determination of
which employees are "parties" under the alter ego test would "pro-
long pretrial discovery and allow the shield of DR 7-104(A)(1) to
be fashioned into a sword. 3
2
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the Niesig court's alter
ego test is a bold attempt to resolve the conflict surrounding the
definition of the term "party" with respect to corporate employ-
ees.3 3 Unfortunately, the alter ego test will probably prove to be as
unworkable as the previously established tests since it is merely an
amalgamation of those tests.3'
The first prong of the alter ego test,35 which seeks to extin-
guish the "potential unfair advantage of extracting concessions and
admissions from [employees] who will bind the corporation, ''6 is
30 Id. at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1037, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
31 Id. at 376-77, 558 N.E.2d at 1036-37, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
Judge Bellacosa commented that the alter ego test contains language similar to that "found
in the Official Comment to ABA Model rule 4.2." Id. But cf. id. at 375 n.6, 558 N.E.2d at
1036 n.6, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499 n.6 (alter ego test not derived from rule 4.2 comment).
The comment to ABA Model Rule 4.2 indicates that the term "party" includes "persons
having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and any other person
whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization
for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on
the part of the organization." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 4.2 comment
(1990). Judge Bellacosa quotes one commentator who noted that "[t]his language is proba-
bly the foggiest of all." Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 377, 588 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499
(Bellacosa, J., concurring) (quoting Wyeth, supra note 8, at 10).
32 Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1037, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (Bellacosa, J.,
concurring).
33 See Bouge v. Smith's Mgm't Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 570 (D. Utah 1990) ("convinced
[Niesig court] has struck the proper balance of fairness, support for legitimate ethical con-
siderations ... and clarity of application and rationality in common sense terms for infor-
mal discovery"); State v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 247 N.J. Super. 314, 324-26, 589 A.2d 180,
184-85 (App. Div. 1991) (adopting Niesig interpretation of disciplinary rule in criminal
case), appeal granted, 1991 Lexis 694 (N.J. June 27, 1991).
3, See supra note 25 and accompanying text; infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
35 See Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498 (first prong
deals with employees who have legal power to bind or impute liability to corporation).
36 Id. It is assumed that the court of appeals' use of the term "bind" was meant in an
evidentiary sense. The hearsay statement of an employer's agent is admissible against the
employer in New York only if the making of the statement is an activity within the scope of
the agent's authority. Kelley v. Diesel Constr. Div. of Carl A. Morse, Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 1, 8,
315 N.E.2d 751, 754-55, 358 N.Y.S.2d 685, 690 (1974); see also FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(D)
(employee statement concerning matters within scope of employment admissible as em-
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similar, if not identical, to the scope-of-employment test.37 The lat-
ter defines corporate employees as "parties" when the information
being sought concerns matters within the scope of their employ-
ment. 8 Although the scope-of-employment test has a substantial
following,39 it forces attorneys to speculate about whether prospec-
tive interviewees have the capacity to bind their corporate em-
ployer, and thus fails to create clear standards against which attor-
neys may gauge their ethical behavior.4 °
The second prong of the alter ego test,4 ' which attempts to
alleviate concerns about protection of the attorney-client privi-
lege,42 may result in pulling every current employee within the
scope of the disciplinary rule. This conclusion is premised on the
fact that virtually every current employee could be held out as
"implementing the advice of counsel." Perhaps Judge Bellacosa
was correct in suggesting that the alter ego test will function like
the overbroad blanket rule.43
In light of the weaknesses of the alter ego test,44 the confusion
concerning the definition of the term "party" is likely to continue
so that attorneys will be unable to conduct ex parte interviews of
corporate employees without fear of violating the disciplinary rule.
A recent line of cases may suggest a solution.43 In Lizotte v. New
ployer admission).
37 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. But see N.Y.L.J., Jul. 18, 1990, at 2, col. 6
(letter to the Editor) (court of appeals made clear in Niesig that applicability of alter ego
test was not confined to upper-echelon employees).
See Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
39 See, e.g., Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 202-03, 691 P.2d 564,
569-70 (1984) (en banc) (discussing and applying management-speaking test).
'0 See Mills Land & Water Co. v. Golden West Ref. Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 116, 129, 230
Cal. Rptr. 461, 468 (1986). "[O]pposing counsel cannot know in advance what will develop
during the interview. Thus, the unilateral decision [of whether to interview ex parte] is
based on expectations or predictions." Id. at 129-30, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 468 (emphasis in
original). But see Comment, supra note 5, at 1297-1304 (test is certain and predictable).
41 Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498 (second prong
deals with employees responsible for effectuating advice of counsel).
42 See id. It is curious that the Court of Appeals provided such protection in light of its
perception of the attorney-client privilege and the disciplinary rule as distinct creatures. See
supra note 21. It is suggested that while these concepts seem distinct in terms of policy and
purpose, they both seek to further the attorney-client relationship, and thus should be
treated as counterparts. See Massa v. Eaton Corp., 109 F.R.D. 312, 314 (W.D. Mich. 1985)
("logic of Upjohn is easily carried over to DR 7-104"); Miller & Calfo, supra note 5, at 1060-
67 (same); Stahl, supra note 7, at 1182 (same).
43 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
44 See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
45 See Miller Oil Co. v. Smith Indus., No. 1:88 CV 785, at 11 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 13, 1990)
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York City Health & Hospital Corp.46 and Suggs v. Capital Cities!
ABC, Inc.,47 the District Court for the Southern District of New
York adopted a case-by-case balancing test4" and, more impor-
tantly, provided a set of mandatory guidelines for attorneys to fol-
low before and during all ex parte interviews. 49 These guidelines,
which, inter alia, provide for disclosure to the prospective inter-
viewee of the adverse attorney's representative capacity and of the
purpose of the interview,5" reduce or even eliminate the potential
for overreaching by opposing counsel. Since the underlying pur-
pose of the disciplinary rule is to prevent such overreaching,5' it is
suggested that by shifting the focus from whom an attorney can
interview ex parte to how an attorney must conduct such inter-
views, the evil that the disciplinary rule seeks to prevent may -be
eliminated without requiring resort to inadequate tests for deter-
mining which corporate employees are "parties."
While the Niesig court briefly mentioned such guidelines, it
did so without elaboration. 52 Ideally, guidelines for ex parte inter-
views should be sufficiently detailed to provide attorneys with
meaningful standards of behavior. Furthermore, the guidelines
should emphasize the need for interviewees to be well informed
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (applying guidelines for permissible ex parte communica-
tions set forth in Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. 4:88 CV 124, at 2 (W.D.
Mich. July 13, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist fie)); Siguel v. Trustees of Tufts College,
No. 88-0626-Y, at 19-20 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (adopt-
ing case-by-case method of determining who is a party and implementing guidelines estab-
lished in Morrison v. Brandeis Univ.); Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 19-21 (D.
Mass. 1989) (holding that courts must analyze interest and needs of parties on basis of facts
and circumstances of each case and setting forth detailed guidelines); Monsanto Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. 88C-JA-118, at 10-11 (Super. Ct. Del. Sept. 10, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Del. file) (setting forth detailed script for attorneys to follow in
conducting ex parte interviews).
46 No. 85 Civ. 7548 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist fie).
4 No. 86 Civ. 2774 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist fie).
48 Id. at 20; Lizotte, No. 85 Civ. 7548, at 9. The district court rejected the blanket rule
that was adopted by the appellate division in Niesig in favor of a case-by-case balancing
approach; this decision was published prior to the court of appeals decision. Suggs, No. 86
Civ. 2774, at 20; Lizotte, No. 85 Civ. 7548, at 8-9.
49 See, e.g., Suggs, No. 86 Civ. 2774, at 24 (setting forth guidelines); Lizotte, No. 85 Civ.
7548, at 15-16 (same); Siguel, No. 88-0626-Y, at 19-20 (same); Monsanto, No. 88C-JA-118,
at 10-11 (same).
:0 Suggs, No. 86 Civ. 2774, at 24.
1 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
12 See Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499. "[lIt is of
course assumed that attorneys would make their identity and interest known to interviewees
and comport themselves ethically." Id.
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about the prospective interviewing thereby reducing the possibility
of interviewees being duped by cunning interviewers. Thus, upon
the initial contact with interviewees, interviewers should "disclose
[their] representative capacity" 53 and "specify the purpose of the
contact. '54 Interviewees also should be informed of their rights "to
refuse to be interviewed" and "to have their own counsel pre-
sent. '55 Similarly, the guidelines should proscribe certain types of
inquiries. If interviewers are prohibited from inquiring into "any
matters observed in the course of the employee's performance of
his or her duty" to the corporation,56 then the possibility that the
employee will make binding admissions against the corporation
would be reduced. In addition, guidelines that prohibit questions
concerning any communication between the employee and the cor-
poration's counsel regarding the action 57 would minimize the
chance that the attorney-client privilege will be violated.
In summary, the alter ego test seems destined to defeat the
expectations of the court of appeals and the bar at large since it is
simply an amalgamation of problematic tests. Implementing de-
tailed guidelines to effectuate the underlying purposes of the disci-
plinary rule instead of concocting tests to determine the status of
employees as "parties" would minimize the potential for over-
reaching, while allowing attorneys to conduct ex parte interviews
with confidence rather than with fear of violating the disciplinary
rule.
Joseph G. Colbert
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(e): Requirement that unwed
parents "live together" as condition to father's right of consent in
adoption of nonmarital child held unconstitutional
Prior to 1980, section 111 of the New York Domestic Relations
Law ("DRL") allowed an unwed mother to place her child up for
" Suggs, No. 86 Civ. 2774, at 24.
5 Id.
51 University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (para-
phrasing Suggs guidelines).
" Suggs, No. 86 Civ. 2774, at 24.
5, See id.
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